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State v. Javier, C., 128 Nev. Adv. Op. 50 (October 4, 2012)1
CRIMINAL LAW & PROCEDURE – PRISONER
FAMILY LAW – JUVENILE DELINQUENT
Summary
An appeal from a district court order dismissing a category B felony charge of battery
under NRS 200.481(2)(f), finding the statute’s definition of “prisoner” was not meant to include
juvenile defendants committed to a detention center for delinquency.
Disposition/Outcome
Juveniles subject to delinquency are not “prisoners” and subject to prosecution for felony
battery by a prisoner under NRS 200.481(2)(f).2 By law, adjudicated delinquents housed at the
Nevada Youth Training Center qualify as civil custodial confinements, and therefore NRS
200.481(2)(f) does not apply to confined juvenile delinquents.
Factual and Procedural History
The State of Nevada charged respondent Javier C., an adjudicated delinquent committed
to the Nevada Youth Training Center (NYTC), as an adult with battery by a prisoner under NRS
200.481(2)(f), a category B felony.
The district court granted Javier C.’s motion to dismiss the charge because Nevada’s
Juvenile Justice Code, NRS Title 5, states adjudicated juvenile delinquents are not to be
considered criminals. 3 The district court also cited Robinson v. State, 4 holding “prisoner” in
terms of NRS 200.481(2)(f), only applies to criminal settings.
The State appealed.
Discussion
Justice Pickering wrote the unanimous opinion of the Court sitting in a three-justice panel.
The question before the Court was whether the adjudicated juvenile delinquent confined to a
civil detention center was a prisoner under the definitions applying to NRS 200.481(f)(2) and
whether he could be charged and prosecuted by the State as an adult for his conduct in the
juvenile detention center.
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I. Standard for De Novo Review
The Court’s review was de novo, because the State’s appeal was based on a question of
statutory construction.
II. Under NRS 200.481(2)(f), the battery committed by a prisoner cannot apply to
Javier C., because he was not a “prisoner” nor a criminal, but a juvenile delinquent
in civil confinement.
The State urged the Court to distinguish this case from Robinson v. State.5 In Robinson v.
State, the defendant was confined for public drunkenness in civil protective custody pursuant to
NRS 458.270.6 The Court found NRS 200.481(f)(2) did not apply to Robinson after beating up
three of his cellmates and the State charged him with the battery by a prisoner. The Court
explained that Robinson “limit[ed] the custodial confinements that will support battery by a
prisoner to criminal custodial confinements.” The State’s argument failed to persuade the Court
that Robinson is not applicable to Javier C.
The Court cited NRS 62E.010(1), which declares that a child adjudicated by juvenile
proceedings under Title 5 is not a criminal and is not convicted. Javier C.’s confinement was
deemed civil and he remains a juvenile subject to delinquency. The Court stated that unless
certified as an adult, criminal proceedings under NRS 200.481(f)(2) do not apply to juvenile
delinquents.
III. The rule of lenity applies to interpret any ambiguities in criminal statutes liberally
and in the accused’s favor.7
The Court explained that ambiguities in interpreting the criminal statute when prosecuting a
defendant should be rule in the defendant’s favor, and the Court rejected the potential
interpretations raised by the State pertaining to other uses of the terms “juvenile” or “child” were
uncertain.
The State relied on the detained-juvenile escape statute, which deemed a child a prisoner
after caught escaping or in an attempt, but the Court rejected the argument. The Court stated that
the fault with the State’s argument [was] a narrow application of one such exception suggesting
in general juvenile delinquents would otherwise not be considered “prisoners.”
Conclusion
The Court affirmed the district court’s order to dismiss the State’s charges against Javier
C. The Court found the district court correctly interpreted NRS 200.481(2)(f) when it found the
Respondent had not qualified as a prisoner under the statute for battery, adding under the rule of
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Moore v. State, 126 P.3d 508, 511 (2006).
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lenity in a should lead a court to resolve any ambiguity found in interpreting the statute “defining
a crime or imposing a penalty”8 in favor of the defendant of an ambiguous statute.
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